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The question of elvii-military relations is the soviet 
Union is a difficult ona. First, thsro is tho issue of de­
fining the terms "military” and "civilian" in the Soviet Union. 
Some have felt it more appropriate to refer to relatione be­
tween the Communist Party and the military. Yet, even that 
kind of an approach is misleading, since most of the Soviet 
military belongs to the Communist Party- Nevertheless, many 
Western analysts believe that a set of complex relationships 
exists between the military and the civilian government. Such 
relationships are important and are characterised by separata 
interests on both sides which may or may not be in hatmony.
This paper is an attempt to examine both sites of the relation­
ship for a period of 1971 through 1983. The purpose is to 
discover interests that may be shown as important on both sides 
as well as changes that may occur over time. Before entering 
into the heart of the issue it is necessary to examine several 
models of Soviet civil-military relations.
Xn considering civil-military relations and motels for 
their analysis three basic approaches have been developed by 
Western students of the Soviet military. These arei the 
"conflict approach" of Roman Kolkowics, the "Institutional- 
Congruence" model of William Odom, and the "Participatory” 
model of Timothy Colton. All three differ from one another 
in their approach and form a spectrum of views on the Soviet 
military. To a certain extent all are useful, but none ean
adequately explain ell facets of the relation between the soli­
tary and the Party in the Soviet Onion.
The first author, Honan Kolkowics, sees the relationship 
as a conflict between two apposed interest groups* Further­
more, not only is tiie relationship conf1iet-prone but it also 
threatens the political stability of the Soviet state. Conf-
flict exists between these two groups because of five anti-
2thetical traits in the two organisations.
Detachment from sooiety Social Involvement
Heroic Symbolism Anonymity
Thus, the military seeks to be elitist and to have professional 
autonomy, while the Party wishes egalitarianism and subordina­
tion to Marxist-Leninist ideology. The military has a strong 
sense of identity with the state and nationalism, but also 
seeks a detachment from society, conversely the Party supports 
because of its ideology, a policy of Proletarian internationalism 
and social involvement. Lastly, the military is eonoerned 
with heroic symbolism, while the Party encourages anonymity* 
This conflict-prone relationship threatens the state be­
cause the military, with its control of armed men, represents 
an inherent challenge to the Party. For Kolkowies, then, tile 
controls that the Party has placed over the military are im­
portant because, without them, the Party would soon be domi­
nated by the military.
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The Kolkowies nodal i m i  relations between th« Party and 
tha military aa thoaa of two opposing interest groups which 
art inherently in oonfliot aa a raault of cartain essential 
characteriatioa of both. Thia viaw loads to tha eonolttsion 
that thera is lirtla cooperation between tha two or that co­
operation ia impossible baeauaa thair intaraata do not cor­
respond. This view ia challenged by William Odom who dis­
agrees with Kolkowies and believes that there oan be and ia 
cooperation between the Party and tha military.
First of all. Odom doaa not accept the view that tha, 
Party and tha military ara two separate and opposed interest 
groups with antithetical traits. In fact, ho argues that 
Kolkowics1s assertion of five "natural” and "desired" traits 
of the two interest groups suffers from empirical and defi­
nitional problems. In other words, after closer examination 
it becomes difficult to determine whether or not these traits 
are "natural" to tha military or desired by the Party. In 
fact, there is much overlap between the two groups and their 
traits. This leads Odom to conclude thati
A much more compelling argument would be that 
the privileged military elite and party elite both 
have an equal stake in the Soviet state and the 
present political order.5
Therefore, according to Odom, there occurs a value-congruence 
between the two. Bach needs the other and both ara willing 
to cooperate to the benefit of both and the whole political 
order.
Timothy Colton argue* for a participatory modal in re­
garding the ralationa batman tha party and tha military.
Colton maintain* that too much emphaaia haa baan plaodd on 
Party control maohaniam*. Ha believe* that emphaaia ahould 
be more appropriately placed on examining military participa-
C '
tion in politic*.
Aa part of hia argument, he ahowa that the Main Political 
Adminiatration (MPA), which ia auppoaadly controlling tha 
military inatitution, haa itaalf begun to identify end aupport 
tha military in ita view*.7 This view of the MPA aa the ar- 
bieulator of tha need* of tha military ia aupported by Prita 
Irmath and Vernon V. Aapaturian in their examination* of 
Soviet military politic*.8 Thua, what waa one* an inatrument 
of Party control over the military haa become a apokeaman for 
the intaraata of the military.
According to Colton, tha military participate* in three 
broad iaaua area* and uaea three baaic mean*, for iaauaa, 
the military ia concerned with deciaiona and policiea which 
may effect ita inatitutional intereata, the value* and in* 
tereats of certain officer*, and aocietal iaauea which effect 
all civilian* aa well aa officer*. The military haa alao 
three way* to influence policy deciaiona. Thia can be don* 
by expert advice, political bargaining, or force.
Colton argue* that the Soviet military participate* in 
political deciaiona in all three area* and will ua* both 
advice and political bargaining, it haa not, however, retorted
to forco. Colton believes that tha alliary doas have tha 
capability to uae force, but haa not desired to do so. Tha 
raaaon that tha military haa not uaad forca la that thfOdgh 
its participation in tha political procaaa its naada and da* 
manda have baen aatiafiad. Therefore, thara haa boon no raa­
aon to uaa forca.10 Colton auma up hia view, which ia vary 
aimilar to that of William Odom, in thia mannari
Claarly both army and party hava banefitad 
from tha ralationahip. Tha party, on tha one 
hand, haa realised important policy goals and 
has bean spared tha challenges from an aroused 
officer corps that have beset civilian regimes 
in many other p
other hand, haa _ ,
status, and professional interests maintained 
and enhanced by Party polioy.il
These are the three basic models for assessing relations 
between the Party and the military in the U.8.8.R. Tha 
Kolkowios model argues for the existence of inherent conflict 
between the Party and the military. The other two do not see 
inherent and inevitable conflict, but argue that cooperation 
occurs between the two. The model of Colton does include the 
possibility of conflict, if the interests of the military are 
not being served. In Odom's model conflict is not viewed as 
very likely. He sees the military and the Party as having 
too much at stake in the present political order to risk dis­
rupting it through conflict.
Bach of these three models assumes and implies a set of 
basic interests which the military, as a group, seeks to have 
met by the Party. These are in order of importances K desire
in modernising
to maintain high Mania at invaatnant In haavy imduwtryj a 
dteaire to maintain a certain amount of iatarnational tannlon
to justify high dafanaa .pending; and a daaira to maintain
12la M lo fio a l ecm s«rratiW a
As with all military eatabliahinemts the noeessity for
higher defense spending is their most overriding concern.
Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, in an adBress for the annlversey of
the creation of the Soviet Army, reminded the Poll there of
their promises and responsibilities:
At the November 1982 CFSt? Central Committee 
Plenum, Yuriy V* Andropov, General Secretary of 
the CPSU Central committee, streeeed: the
Politburo ha* considered and does consider it a 
matter of obligation to give the Army and Navy 
all they need, especially in the current inter- 
national situation.
Thanks to unflagging concsrn by the Communist 
Party and the selfless labor of Soviet people, 
our Army and Navy are equipped with the most 
modern weapons, including nuclear missiles, and 
with mighty combat technology#13
The Sovie; military believes that It is the duty of the Party 
and the people to provide all that is necessary for the mili­
tary to form an adequate defense. As a corollary, it is the 
duty of the Soviet Armed Forces to provide the defense of the 
Soviet state.
As a second interest, the military also seeks emphasis 
on spending in heavy industry as opposed to "light” or con­
sumer industry. In fact, part of the early Breahnev coali­
tion was based on the advocacy of increased defense and heavy 
industry spending at the expense of light i n d u s t r y . T h i s
ear ted him the support of the military. The military sees 
emphasis on heavy industry as necessary to provide the ad­
vanced weaponry needed for defense.
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Thirdly, it is argued that the military seeks to promote 
a certain amount of international tension so as to justify 
military spending. This is less a conspiracy on the part of 
the military than it is a tendency to see the world in gloom- 
tinted glasses. This leads Malcom Mackintosh to conclude 
that, in general, the military favors a hard-line foreign
policy, but when it comes to actual deployment of forces they
15tend to be cautious. The military, because of their way of 
viewing the outside world and because of a need to justify 
their defense spending, support hard-line foreign policies 
and the view of the international situation as being in gen­
eral hostile.
Lastly, the military favors conservative ideology and 
national unity.16 The military supports tight controls over 
society to insure morale and provide unity. Dissenters must 
be dealt with swiftly and harshly. De-Stalinization must not 
go so far as to disrupt unity in the society. For the military, 
a stable and unified society is of the utmost importance and 
a conservative ideology is believed to promote this.
Of the three models, a combination of the Colton and 
Odom models is the approach used in this paper. The Kolkowicz 
model has merit in arguing that there are certain interests 
or objectives which the military wishes to achieve, nevertheless,
fthere is little justification to be found for the assertion 
that there is an inherent conflict between the two. Hot only 
is it difficult to find evidence of such but it does not 
appear to be in the best interest of either institution to 
engage in a struggle which can only cause harm for both of 
them. William Odom is correct in arguing that there are many 
areas in which both the Party and the military have similar 
interests but he gives the impression that the military has 
simply become another bureaucracy of the Party. This does 
not seem to be the case. The military is not just another 
bureaucratic and administrative arm of the Party. It parti** 
cipates and supports the Party because its needs are being met. 
According to Colton:
The army has certainly displayed no inclina­
tion whatever to use force to further its insti­
tutional aims. These aims have been well servedby the regime.*8
The central aim of this paper is to incorporate some of 
those interests listed above along with other possible inter­
ests to form questions about relations between the Party and 
the Military. Also considered simultaneously# will be ques­
tions relatirg to the Party and their interests as implied 
by a discussion of basic military interests. A central theme 
will be one of comparison and contrast. In other words# do 
the interests and viewpoints of the military and the Party 
ever converge over time or do they always stay divergent?
In examining the central themes of relations between the Party 
and the military this paper takes the approach of looking at
9major speeches made by representatives of both sides. These 
speeches were then analysed in the hope of answering a bank 
of questions which would allow some general conclusions to 
be made. The questions that were used in the analysis wares
1) What is the relative importance of the national 
military security as compared to detente relations# and vice- 
versa# for the military and the Party?
2) Where does heavy industry rank as compared to light 
industry for the military and the Party?
3) what are their views on the hostility or perceived 
threat of U.S. and NATO?
4) What is the importance of increased defense spending 
as compared to other spending areas for both areas?
5) Does the military always call for increased defense 
spending?
6) Do the military and the Party agree or disagree 
on answers to the above questions?
7) Do the answers to these questions change over time# 
and if so# how?
On the military side# the speeches of Defense Ministers 
Andrei A. Grechko and Dmitri F. Ustinov were examined. On 
the Party side# the speeches were primarily those of Leonid X. 
Brezhnev. Yuriy V. Andropov was of lesser importance due to 
the shortness of his office and his sickness through more 
than half of it. To insure accuracy and to even out other 
third factors# an attempt was made to use speeches which were
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given to the same audience or at the same occasions* There* 
fore, in following this approach most of the data came from 
speeches given during the three Party Congresses of 1971,
1976, and 1981 or from speeches given at May day or November 7, 
October revolution ceremonies* Hopefully, this will have 
eliminated most of the biases that may have occurred in the 
speeches•
The paper has been divided into two sections. The first 
deals with economic questions and issues• The second deals 
with questions of foreign policy* Both are interrelated, 
especially for the military who strongly view economic policy 
as an adjunct to foreign policy and defense issues* A time 
scale of approximately 1971 to 1983 was used in the examina­
tion.
Economic Issues
Beginning in 1971 at the 24th CPSU Congress the major 
focus of discussion on economic policy was the 9th five year 
plan for the development of the U.S*S*R. national economy 
from 1971 to 1976* The goal as stated by the resolution wast
The chief task of the five-year plan is to 
ensure a significant upswing in the materialand 
cultural level ofthe people’s life on the basis 
or high development rates In socialist produc- 
Hon, itsincreased efficiency, scien^ric anir" 
technical progress and the accelerated growthof 
labor productivity.
The resolution later goes on to define what is meant by social­
ist production, making it clear that it is light industry or
i
1consumer goods which is intended.
jIn implementing the chief tasks of the five* 
year plan, it is necessarys to ensure high growth 
rates in and the proportional development of 
socialist production, especially agriculture, light 
industry and the food industry, and significantly a
to increase the efficiency of all branches of the 
national economy.20
In this resolution submitted to the 24th CPSU Congress there 
is a strong commitment to increase consumer consumption, mainly 
in the form of expanding light industry. In their speeches 
at the same CPSU Congress, Brezhnev and Kosygin quote the 
same phrase of the resolution and argue for the same commit* 
ment.^*
The plan for expanding light industry was first explained 
by Brezhnev in his opening speech at the 24th Congress. He
i
began the section on heavy industry by making the usual state* 
ments about the importance of heavy industries and defense 
industries to the economic well-being of the country. He 
then made this statement which is the crux of the entire 9th 
five*year plan.
Finally, the development of heavy industry 
assumes special importance because without this 
it is impossible to accomplish the fundamental 
tasks of increasing the people's well-being.
Heavy industry must substantially expand the 
production of means of production for the 
accelerated development of agriculture, light 
industry, and the food industry and the still 
greater development of housing construction, 2o 
trade and everyday services to the population.
Brezhnev goes on to make the message even clearer by stating *
The Party is setting still another important 
task for heavy industry— to expand the production
■1
11
j
12
of consumer goods directly in its own enterprises.
All its branches have considerable possibilities 
for doing so. In this connection. I should like 
to mention the defense industry.23
Brezhnev was arguing for an interesting coalition. He
was suggesting that the debate did not need to be light in-
dustry/consumer goods versus heavy industry and defense but
fundings could have continued for heavy industry and defense
if they were willing to put some of their productive capacity
towards production of consumer goods. This meant continued
support of heavy industry because of its importance to main*
24taining the proper level of defense capability. Did the 
military accept this deal? If silence signals acceptance 
then there was agreement with this general plan. At the time# 
the then Defense Minister, Andrei A. Grechko, was more con­
cerned with the international situation and the need for 
increased defense spending. In his speech in response to 
Brezhnev's report to the 24th CPSU Congress, Grechko empha­
sized the need for defense spending due to the hostile inter-
25national situation. Increased defense spending is what 
the military wanted and that is what they got. An examination 
of Table 1, which is a compilation of Soviet military expen­
ditures as estimated by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, shows that during the years of 1971 to 1976 an increase 
in defense spending at levels greater than before ocurred.
From this evidence it is clear that there was a commitment 
on the part of the Party to increase light industry and to
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Table 1: Soviet Military Expenditures
Millions of dollars,
Year Constant to 1979 Before. :
1971 140948 ____
1972 147032 6000
1973 153067 60001974 160011 7000
1975 165999 6000
1976 173974 8000
1977 176984 3000
1978 179998 3000
1979 183000 3000
1980 188032 5000
Sourcei See footnote # 26.
increase defense spending. Heavy industry and the defense 
industry were to provide the means to increase consumer pro­
duction. For the military, the overriding concern was in­
creased defense spending. This desire was satisfied for them, 
and due to the lack of response on the heavy industry - light 
industry deal, it would appear that this also, at least, was 
not opposed. Underscoring the Party's commitment to defense 
was Kosygin's report to the 24th Congress!
The Party Central Committee and the Soviet 
government have devoted and are constantly de­
voting attention to the strengthening of the 
country1s defense capability and ine development 
of the defense industry• We are obliged to do 
this by the present international situation and 
by the interests of our homeland's security.27
In 1971, at the beginning of the 24th CPSU Congress,
Breshnev was advocating a deal. An economic deal which would
allow him to increase the production of consumer goods and yet
would aliow him to continue high levels of spending in heavy
14
industry and defense. This became the basis fo r Breshnev’s 
support in the Party and formed an important theme in the 
relationship between the Party and the military. The mili­
tary would get its money but it would have to pay its share 
by promoting consumer production.
This economic deal was what was intended by Brezhnev, 
but was this what really occurred during the period of 1971 
to 1976? As has been shorn before in Table 1, defense spending 
did increase at significant rates during this period. The 
information for Table 2 was taken from a Soviet economic 
statistics publication. On this table group A indicates heavy 
industry while group B signifies light industry* While Soviet 
economic data is considered to be at best unreliable, these 
can be taken at face value because what is important is not 
the numbers themselves but the changes and rates of change 
present in them. What they show is quite interesting*
Table 2: Investment Capital Spent on Heavy Industry and Light
Industry Money Spent in Billions of Roubles .
Group h Change in Group B Change in
Year (heavy industry) Group A (light industry) Group B
1970 24.8 4.5
1971 26.3 42*5 4.6 + .1
1972 28.4 +2.1 4.8 +.2
1973 30.1 +1.7 4.8 +0
1974 32.6 +2.5 5.0 + .2
1975 34.7 +2.1 5.2 + .2
1976 36*2 +1.5 5.4 + .2
Source t See Footnote #28*
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They show that, although in the speeches made by the Party 
leadership there were claims that light industry and con­
sumer goods were to be of top priority, this did not occur 
during the actual carrying out of the 9th five-year plan.
Why did this occur? It would seem very unlikely that the 
leadership never really intended what their speeches said* 
Therefore, the answer lies in a cause that occurred after the 
speeches and during implementation. In the end, what this 
shows is that the military still came out with their needs 
being met. Defense spending and heavy industry were both 
increased.
In 1976, at the 25th Congress, the importance of light 
industry was again maintained. It is also clear that in this 
10th five-year plan heavy industry was considered of prime
importance s
The essence of the Party1a economic strategy 
permeating both the i H h  rive^Year plan ant the 
long-term plan, it VlMKVfajJLI
cnnrit-lry1 ■
rnnUl renewal Of P * ______ensuring of
industry —  tht H  »j-iaiIB»y.«»
Why th« change? Part of th. r m e n  U * .  in the faiieve ot 
heavy Industry to fulfill their pert of the bargain. Aeeordintf 
to Brezhnevs
we still have not learned how, while ensuring 
high rates for the development of heavy indwl* 
try, to develop Group B and the aervice. .ph.r. 
at an aooel.rated pace also. 30
N.verthelees, it is also clear that Br.zhMV H i  i U o  unwilling
to completely break the M W  .eonewie dealt
16
The output of consumer goods by the heavy in­
dustry enterprises will remain very important*
The Party will hold strictly responsible those 
executives who, under various pretexts, fail 
to fulfill their established plans for the 
production of those goods.
This tilt towards heavy industry is important, because
assuming that the military does support heavy industry over
light industry, then this coalition and the gradual change
of the Party to increased support for heavy industry shows a
point at which the interests of the military and the Party
converged. Thus, during the 25th CPSU Congress, the Party
was converging in views toward those of the military.
In 1981, at the 26th CPSU Congress, the political forces
shifted to favoring light industry again* Brezhnev made this
statement in their favor: "The expansion of the production
of consumer goods# the improvement of their quality and the
development of the services sphere are acquiring paramount
importance in the Party's efforts to bring about an upswing
32in people's well-being." That Brezhnev argued for an in­
crease in consumer production is not suprizing* The interest­
ing point is that he no longer accompanied this with a call 
for an alliance of heavy industry and light industry* The 
calls are for increases in light industry higher than heavy 
industry.
As you know, comrades, the draft Basic Guide­
lines for the next five-year plan stipulate a cer­
tain acceleration in the development rates of Group 
B - they will be somewhat higher than the growth 
rates for Group A* This is good* The objective is to
17
create a consumer goods and services sector 
that is truly up to date and meets the people's 
requirements.3 3
This planned increase in the growth rates of light industry
was also the first area of importance for Prime Minister
34Tikhonov's speech on light industry*
According to these speeches, light industry in the minds 
of the Party had taken precedence over spending for heavy 
industry. The figures for 1982 bear this out. Spending for 
light industry grew by .4 billion roubles - the highest 
increase yet - while heavy industry grew by 1 billion roubles. 
Nevertheless, higher spending levels for heavy industry con­
tinued.
Table 3 shows a compilation of economic figures for the 
periods during which these plans were in process. What these 
figures show is that, the CPSU Congress speeches not with­
standing, there has been a significant and protracted commit­
ment on the part of the top leadership of the Party to increase 
defense and heavy industry spending. These figures show a 
lack of commitment to light industry in real terms. Table 4 
shows even clearer the Party's commitment to increased defense 
spending. Up until 1980, over 50% of the Soviet budget went 
to defense spending. A sizable figure emphasizing the impor­
tance of defense spending to the Party.
In their speeches the Party leaders have shown a great 
desire to increase the living standards of the Soviet popu­
lation by increasing consumer goods through light industry.
Table 3: Combined Economic Figures: 1970-1982
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Source
Investment Capital
Defense Spending in 
billions of dollars. 
Constant in 1979
Change in 
Defense Spending, 
Rounded
Heavy Change Light Change
Industry in Industry in
Billions of Heavy Billions of Light 
Roubles Industry Roubles Industry
N.A.
140948
147032
153067
160011
165999
173974
176984
179998
183000
188032
N.A.
N.A.
6000
6000
7000
6000
8000
3000
3000
3000
5000
24*8 — 4.5 —
26.3 +2.5 4.6 + .1
28.4 +2.1 4.8 + .2
30.1 +1.7 4.8 0
32.6 +2.5 5.0 + .2
34.7 +2.1 5.2 + .2
36.2 +1.5 5.4 +• 2
38.1 +1.9 5.3 -.1
40.5 +2.4 5.5 + .2
40.8 + .3 5.4 -.1
41.6 +.8 5.7 +.3
43.5 +1.9 6.0 + .3
44.5 +1 6.4 + .4
See Footnote #35.
<30
Table 4; Military Expenditures as a Percentage of 
Central Government Expenditures.
Year Military Expenditure
1971 67.3%
1972 66.6
1973 64.7
1974 63.9
1975 61.5
1976 58.8
1977 57.0
1978 55.1
1979 51.4
1980 48.3
Source: See Footnote # 36.
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This support has been evident throughout most of the speeches 
given by Brezhnev and others• On the other hand, when actual 
economic figures published by the Soviets are compared this 
desire is not realized in those figures. When it comes down 
to roubles and kopecks, Soviet spending priorities have been 
characterized by this hierarchy: defense, heavy industry and
last light industry. This does not even count agriculture 
which has been placing third, ahead of light industry. Thus, 
in words and intentions, the Party has wanted to support light 
industry but in reality this has not occurred.
A reason why military and heavy industry spending has 
been of greater importance derives from the Colton and Odom 
models. The Party has been gaining the support of the mili­
tary through large increases in defense spending and to a lesser 
extent heavy industry. This conclusion fits in with the par­
ticipatory model of Timothy Colton who argues that the mili­
tary will participate in the political process to meet its 
needs. One of these needs is defense spending.
That the increased defense spending was a way to insure 
support from the military becomes even more evident when con­
sidering the statements made by the military in the foreign 
policy area. These increases in defense spending were made 
during the time of detente between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union. The international situation had an importart effect 
on modifying the relations between th Party and the military. 
This, in the economic realm, was a key structure in military
21
and Party relations between 1971 to 1983.
Foreign Policy Questions in Soviet Civil-Military Relations
The second half of this paper deals with issues relating
to foreign policy during the period of 1971 to 1983. Foreign
policy questions relating to the possibility of detente with
the U*S and the perceived hostility of the U.S* and its
allies were of importance to the military and the Party* One
important question was the issue of detente*
An examination of a speech given by Brezhnev during the
24th Congress shows that the Party did consider detente with
the U.S. as possible and desirable* He declared thats
We proceed from the premise that the improve­
ment of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S.A* is possible* Our principled line with re­
spect to the capitalist countries including the 
U.S*A* , is consistently and fully to implement in 
practice the principles of peaceful coexistence, 
to develop mutually advantageous ties and ~  with 
those that are ready to do so —  to cooperate in 
the field of strengthening peace, making mutual 
relations with these as stable as possible.37
This belief in the importance of detente was again made
evident by Kosygin, who emphasized the willingness of the
U.S*S.R. to enter into economic cooperation with the capi-
38talist countries.
These statements show that the Party intended to seek 
detente with the U.S. and its allies. This detente was to 
be mainly in the form of increased economic cooperation. 
Emphasis is placed on this Soviet intention for increased
economic cooperation because from Brezhnev's and Kosygin's
speeches it is clear that detente did not mean that defense
39spending would be decreased or even leveled. This is con­
firmed by the estimated defense spending figures during the 
time of the 9th five-year plan in Table 1.
Economic relations with the U.S. and Western Europe were 
important because they were to be the means for revitalizing 
the Soviet economy. This trade also helped the Soviet arms 
buildup by allowing funds to be diverted to military spending.
The response of Defense Minister Andrei Grechko to 
detente was cautious and ambivalent.
The Soviet Union is struggling, as it always 
has, for genuine peace, for the freedom and equality 
of all peoples, for their inalienable right to decide 
their own fate without outside interference. How­
ever, in conditions of acute international tension 
and the imperialist state's incessant arms race, 
our country is compelled to take the recessary 
defensive measures and to reinforce its peaceful 
policy by strengthening its defense capability and 
increasing the combat potential and combat readiness 
of the Armed Forces.
An interpretation that can be made from this quote is that 
the military did not agree with the Party that peaceful co­
existence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could exist. 
They also did not consider detente relations to be desirable. 
On the other hand, as indicated by the first half of the 
quote, the military was willing to support the policy of 
detente although they did not consider it to be desirable.
This support may have been given in return for increased 
defense spending. This argument is supported by the large
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increases in military expenditures which occurred during 1971 
to 1976. Therefore, in 1971, the Party was advocating de­
tente. The military agreed to support the policy in return, 
most likely, for increased defense spending. As time went 
on detente weakened and disintegrated. This strengthened 
the position of the military. This was reflected in later 
speeches which placed less emphasis on detente and more on 
strengthening defense.
In 1971, the plan for the next five years was stated to 
be one of promoting detente relations between the Soviet 
Union and the West. This policy continued through these 
years and in the eyes of the Party leadership was successful*
In his speech to the 25th Congress in 1976, Breshnev stated 
that considerable progress had been achieved during this 
period.
Although world peace is still by no means 
guaranteed, we have every reason to say with 
confidence that improvement in the international 
climate is convincing evidence that the achieve­
ment of lasting peace is not merely a good inten­
tion but a completely realistic aim.41
For Brezhnev and the Party, this improvement in the international 
climate resulted primarily from the improvement of relations 
with the U.S. In fact, the most likely reason for a Soviet 
perception of improving relations was the completion of the 
SALT I and II treaties* "The turn for the better in our rela­
tions with the largest power of the capitalist world - the 
United States of America - has, of course, been of decisive
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importance in lessening the threat of a new world war and
42in strengthening peace."
Foreign policy is not made in a vacuum and is greatly 
affected by international events. Thus, the speeches on 
foreign policy questions reflect these international develop­
ments. Three notable events occurred during the period when 
the speeches cited above were made: the signing of the SALT
I treaty in 1972j the Vladivostok talks of 1974; and the com­
pletion of the Helsinki accords in 1975. The SALT I treaty 
and the Vladivostok talks dealt with issues relating primarily 
to nuclear strategic weapons. SALT I included: 1) A ban
on ABM development 2) A five-year agreement fixing the number 
of I CBM and SLBM launchers on both sides. Lastly, an agree­
ment to use national technical means of verification to en­
sure compliance and a promise not to interfere with the other 
side's satellites. The Vladivostok talks concluded limi­
tations on strategic systems, including bombers, not included 
in SALT 1.
The Helsinki accords gained for the U.S.S.R. recognition 
of the political status and territorial boundaries of Eastern 
Euro It also dealt with important issues of economic and 
technical cooperation between East and West. It is with these 
accomplishments in mind that Brezhnev made the statements 
that relations had improved between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the 
Party was committed to a foreign policy of detente. The aim
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was to conclude arms control agreements end reduce tension*
It was also to increase trade with the U«S. and Western 
Europe. The military's reaction to this new foreign policy 
was mixed. The quotation from Defense Minister Grechko's 
speech in response to the Brezhnev opening speech at the 24th 
Congress shows that the military stated its support for the 
new policy of peaceful coexistence or detente* On the other 
hand, in the same statement, Grechko emphasised the belief 
that there still was a continued U.S. threat. This had the 
implication that increased defense spending was necessary 
to counter the U.8* threat* This same reaction by Grechko 
occurred again in his 1974 speech during the October Revolution 
festivities in Red Square* First Grechko statedi
Great successes have been achieved in the
implementation of the Peace Program set forth 
by the 24th CPSU Congress* The principles of 
peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous 
cooperation among states regardless of their 
social systems are becoming more and more 
firmly established in the practice of inter­
national relations***
This stated the support of the military for the policy of 
peaceful coexistence. Later, in the same speech he stated 
reservations about the level of hostility in the international 
situation: "The forces of international reaction and aggres­
sion have not laid down their arms* They oppose the positive 
changes in the world arena, and they are striving to poison
the international atmosphere and to return the world to the
44time of the 'cold war'"* This mixed reaction of the military
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leaders to detente was a continuing one and its thread can 
be traced very easily in the speeches of Defense Ministers 
Andrei A. Grechko and Dmitri F. Ustinov throughout the 1970s.
Again, in 1975 during the October Revolution Red Square 
ceremonies, Grechko reiterated his position that peaceful 
coexistence had been successful, specifically mentioning 
the Helsinki accords. At the same time, he also mentioned the 
concerns of the military about the situation in the world.
• , . As a result of the consistent imple­
mentation of the Reace Program adopted by the 
24th CPjU Congress, the coordinated policies of 
the fraternal socialist countfiea and the 
struggle of all peace-loving forces, the inter­
national situation is developing along lines 
of the further easing of tension and of con­
structive mutually advantageous cooperation ** 
betwaen statas with different social systerna.
Further on, in contradiction to what he just said, ha statedt 
"However, aggressive imperialist forces that are stubbornly 
opposed to the easing of international tension and are stepping 
up the arms race are still active in the w o r l a . T h i s  atti­
tude of mixed reaction was evident not only in the speeches 
of Grechko but also in those of his successor, Dmitri Ustinov. 
Ustinov, at the same Red Square ceremonies in 1976, gave in 
a long quotation the best example of the military*s cautionary 
and ambivalent approach to detente.
Our Party's Central Committee and the Soviet 
government are persistently and consistently im­
plementing the program, worked out by the 25th 
CPSU Congress, of continued struggle for peaceful 
and international cooperation! for the freedom 
and independence of peoples. Thanks to the efforts 
of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries 
and the progressive public of the world at large,
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favorable new conditions are being created for 
the development of the process of the easing of 
international tension and cooperation between 
states of different social systems and cultural 
fields.
At the same time it is quite evident that 
the successes of detente are evoking stubborn 
opposition from aggressive imperialist circles.
Ignoring the will of the peoples and the 
sovereign rights of states, they are striving 
to check the progressive development of the 
world revolutionary process, inflate military 
budgets and continue their dangerous provoca­
tion in various parts of the world.47
Therefore, as evidenced in the above speeches, the military 
felt obliged to support detente. Yet, it is also clear from 
the speeches that it also had reservations. As time went on 
thereservations strengthened.
An examination of the speeches given at the October 
Revolution Red Square ceremonies for 1978, 1979, and 1980, 
shows that over time the attitude of the military shifted 
towards greater hostility to the U.S. and the detente pro­
cess. During Red Square ceremonies in 1978, Ustinov made this 
statements
In international developments the irresistible 
process of further changing the correlation of forces 
in favor of peace, democracy and socialism is con­
tinuing , At the same time the international situa­
tion remains complex. It is aggravated as a result 
of che striving by the aggressive, imperialist 
circles to return the world to the Cold War. They 
are whipping up the arms race, trying to achieve 
military superiority over the socialist countries 
and interfere in their internal affairs.48
Then, in 1979 at the Red Square ceremonies, he saids
The main direction of this initiative is the 
further deepening of the process of detente and the 
strengthening of peaceful cooperation between states.
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As a worthy example of consistent implementation 
of the principles of Leninist foreign policy, the 
constructive proposals of the Soviet Union open 
up the possibility of avoiding another escalation 
of the arms race, and of stepping onto the path 
of real disarmament. ^
And later he said: "The interests of the security of our
Motherland and the complicated international situation demand
from the Soviet people high vigilance and the strengthening
50of the economic and defense might of the Soviet State."
Lastly, in 1980, Ustinov at the Red Square ceremonies made 
this vitriolic attack.
The peace-loving direction of international 
politics is opposed by forces of oppression, mili­
tarism, and aggression, the actions of U.S. imper­
ialism and the aggressive NATO bloc. They are 
striving to return mankind to a new Cold War, 
increasing military preparations. The latest step 
increasing the danger of a nuclear missile con­
flict is the adoption of the United States of the 
so-called new nuclear strategy.51
A comparison of these speeches with the earlier ones 
shows a dramatic shift in attitudes. Especially comparing the 
1974 speech of Grechko with the 1980 speech of Ustinov. In 
the 1974 speech, Grechko mentioned the Peace Programs as
being successful but cautioned that the international situation 
was still hostile. In the 1980 speech, Ustinov concentrated 
on the hostility of the U.S. and the peace-loving intentions 
of the U.S.S.R. He did not mention at all the Peace Program 
begun during the time of the 24th Party Congress and reaffirmed 
during the 25th Party Congress. Part of the shift is probably 
due to the fact that these are two different men but this is 
not a totally satisfactory answer. The speeches that Ustinov
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made in 1976 and 1978 were restatements of the points made 
in speeches of Grechko in earlier years. The answer lies 
in outside events not wholly under the control of the Soviet 
military or Party.
The factors which resulted in a shift in the attitude of
military representatives also had an effect on the policy
of the Party. The main effect of the outside events was to
place the Party in a quandary over the future of detente» On
the one hand, Brezhnev emphasized the threat of the U.S.
and its unwillingness to pursue a policy of detente.
"Opponents of detente, of limiting armaments and of improving
relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries
52have noticeably stepped up their activity of late." And 
also later in the speech he stated:
Military spending is growing at an unprece­
dented pace. In the U.S., it has reached $150 
billion a year. But even these astronomical fig­
ures do not suit the American military-industrial 
complex— it demands more* Yielding to Washington's 
demands, the U.S.'s NATO allies have pledged—  
though some did so very reluctantly— to automatically 
increase military appropriations almost until the 
end of the century.
The outside factors which have influenced the speeches 
of the military and the Party had been the failure and death 
of detente. Beginning in the late 1970's with the Senate's 
refusal to ratify quickly the SALT II treaty and its with­
drawal from Senate consideration by President Carter after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, detente declined and died* 
In his speeches to the 26th Congress, Brezhnev referred to
huge military expenditures in the U.S. These military 
expenditures were those of the new Reagan administration 
which, in 1981, began a large arms build-up. These outside 
factors brought the military and the P~~ty into agreement 
that there was a significant threat from the U.S., in 
their view. The Party was not as negative about detente as 
the military but their respective positions on this issue 
were drawing closer. This was favorable for the military.
It is clear from speeches before and leading up to this time 
that the military was never too thrilled about detente with 
the U.S.
It is also clear that, for the Party, the failure of 
detente put them into a quandary. Brezhnev acknowledged 
the threat of the new U.S. arms build-up but he was unwilling 
to abandon detente. From the same speech in which he attacked 
the Americans for bringing on a new cold war he made this 
very moving appeal.
The danger of war does indeed hang over the 
U.S., as it does over all other countries in the 
world. But its source is not the Soviet Union, 
not its mythical superiority, but the arms race 
itself and the continuing tension in the world.
We are prepared to combat this genuine, not 
imaginary danger— hand in hand with America, with 
the European states, with all countries on our 
planet. To try to prevail over the other side in 
the arms race or to count on victory in a nuclear 
war is dangerous madness.5*
This appeal was followed by an offer to continue the appropriate
talks on strategic arms, presumably SALT III. 55
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Buti for some in the Party, this possibility was seen 
as extremely remote. For them, the Soviet policy of peace­
ful coexistence had brought a U.S. reaction in the form of 
greatly increased military spending* The failure of detente 
and ever increasing world tensions were blamed solely on 
the U.S. This was the view of Politburo member V. V. Grishin 
who stated in a long, vitriolic excerpt at an October 
Revolution ceremony thats
The vast significance of this policy for the 
fate of mankind is becoming especially apparent 
today, when the U.S* ruling circles have taken it 
into their heads to cancel everything positive that 
was achieved during the 1970s, to bury detente 
and revive the cold war. Under cover of the myth 
about a Soviet threat, they have embarked on a 
course upsetting the existing military-strategic 
parity between the U*S*S*R. and the U,S., gaining 
military superiority for themselves and dictating 
political conditions to others from a position of 
strength. Monstrous doctrines that justify the 
permissibility of nuclear wars are being proclaimed* 
Claims to world hegemony rest on a policy of an un­
restrained arms race* More and more new types and 
systems of weapons of mass destruction, intended 
for deployment on the ground, at sea, and in the 
atmosphere, and now even in outer space, are being 
created* Gigantic sums of money, running not into 
just billions but trillions of dollars are being 
spent for these purposes.56
In the end, the Party resolved its dilemma in much the
same way the military had resolved its early on. It decided
to & rgue that the international situation was hostile and
unfavorable. This required a strong defense. Nevertheless,
the possibility for talks was left open. This compromise
formula was reflected in Ustinov's October Revolution speech
57at the Kremlin palace of Congresses.
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Even with this compromise solution, as time passed the 
weight of the international situation and the military were 
against detente. In his Red Square ceremonies speech in 1982, 
Ustinov concentrated on the U.S. threat, rather than on the 
prospects for detente*
Firmly defending the interests of socialism 
and the freedom and national independence of peoples, 
the Soviet Union takes into consideration the fact 
that the aggressive forces of imperialism, above 
all those of the U.S., have brought the intensity 
of their military preparations to an unprecedented 
level, are inciting armed conflicts in various parts 
of the world, and are irresponsibly threatening 
the use of nuclear weapons.3®
Several conclusions can be drawn from this litany of 
speeches, the first of which is that the prime initiator and 
articulator of foreign policy remains the Party. The military 
may advise, persuade, and badger, especially in their speeches 
but the last word remains with the Party* In the early years 
of detente, from 1971 to 1978, the speeches of the military 
were such that they accepted the policy of peaceful coexis* 
tence of the Party and its success. But, in the same speeches, 
they would argue the need to be concerened with the U.S. threat. 
It was not until the late 1970s that the military could empha­
size openly the threat of the U.S. and its allies rather than 
the possibility for detente. In a fashion the military could 
says "I told you so!" All along, they had not supported 
detente wholeheartedly. Even so, the Party was not forced 
to give up detente by the military. It had done so willingly 
after the failure of detente.
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The second conclusion flows from the first; namely, 
that the speeches of both sides reflect compromises in their 
stands on foreign policy* The military, at first, compro­
mised the most* Later, it gained what it had lost because of 
the failure of detente in the Soviet perspective. One could 
easily argue that the military really did not give up anything 
because during this period it gained large increases in Soviet 
military spending. On the other hand, indications from 
speeches, plus the fact that it dropped support as soon as 
it was possible, lead to the conclusion that the military sup­
ported detente only reluctantly*
The third conclusion is that the Party has been the prime 
supporter of detente* It has had the most at stake in its 
success* So much so, that even in the later years when events 
were against it, the Party continued to hold out hopes for 
the revival of detente* For the military, detente was not 
seen as important and in fact could be seen as a danger.
Both sides were influenced greatly about detente by events 
which were completely out of their control. The failure of 
SALT II and the arms build-up of the Reagan administration 
were notable examples*
Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union concerning 
foreign policy are characterized by a degree of conflict 
and compromise on both sides. The tone of the speeches of 
the military leaders shows that their perception of the degree 
of threat from the U*S* and NATO is high. Even during the
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height of detente, the speeches were warning of the hostility 
of the international situation. This is strikingly different 
from the Party under Brezhnev, who had at times viewed the 
international situation as quite favorable. Even when it 
had soured he was unwilling to abandon detente. This dif­
ference in views stems from the different means of enhancing 
national security; detente versus military force. One empha­
sizes military force or national military security, while the 
ether emphasizes economic and political relations or detente. 
Both are believed to enhance national security.
The Party has considered detente of prime importance.
This importance has derived from a desire to fulfill certain 
policy objectives. First was the desire for Western techno­
logy to modernize the Soviet economy. Second was Moscow's 
China problem. Detente with the U.S. and the West would pro­
vide maneuvering room while negotiating with the Chinese. It 
would also reduce the likelihood of a two front confrontation 
with NATO and China. Thirdly, detente was a means to gain 
formal Western recognition of Eastern European boundaries. 
Lastly, and most importantly, was the need to relax the inter­
national environment and to stabilize the strategic arms 
race. A realization occurred that the present situation 
could not continue at such high levels of tension. Thus, 
because of these objectives, detente was an economic and poli­
tical program as well as a military-security one.
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For the military detente was inimical to their interests* 
The purpose of detente, by definition, was the relaxation of 
tensions. This meant that much of the reason for being of the 
military would be lost* This would occur because if the inter* 
national situation is increasingly favorable and less hostile 
than the importance of the military decreases. Thus, the 
military, partly because its their job to find threats in the 
world, and partly because it is a threat to their institutional 
interests consider the issue of national military security 
to be more important than detente relations.
This line of reasoning leads to a possible conclusion 
that a reason for increased Soviet military expenditures 
was detente itself* To gain the support of a reluctant 
military, increased military spending was promised* This 
was not the only reason for the arms build-up - which has a 
multitude of causes - but it is one which fits the evidence. 
Increased military expenditures and the Soviet arms build-up 
also had the effect of increasing the role of the military 
in foreign policy.
Detente allowed the creation of a nuclear "canopy” 
supported by the SALT process and strategic nuclear parity 
of the U.S. and U.S*S*R* Under this "canopy" the availability 
of conventional strategic forces became important. The 
creation of a Soviet "blue water” navy and air transport 
system, plus the increasing access of the Soviet Union to 
air and naval facilities, gave the Soviet Union greatly
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increased power projection turning it into a global power.60 
All of these events had an influence on relations between 
the Party and the military. The conclusion is that the mili­
tary made up for the detente process by the increasing impor­
tance of conventional strategic forces which are controlled 
by the military. Soviet foreign policy in the 1970's and 1980's 
has been increasingly characterized by the military dimen­
sion. Whether from the preponderance of Soviet military power 
in Europe to the Afghanistan invasion in 1979. It is very 
likely that the military will continue to have influence in 
the foreign policy realm as long as military power continues 
to be a primary reason for Soviet super-power status.
For the Party, its role as the main creator, initiator, 
and articulator of foreign policy will continue. Foreign 
policy has not only a military dimension, but also economic 
and political dimensions. It is in these latter two, that 
the supremacy of the Party is suite evident. It is because 
of its prime role in all these dimensions that the Party does 
not always agree with the military. The military can only 
play an effective primacy role in the military dimension.
Thus, it is most concerned with military spending, national 
military security, and the world threat. Differences arise 
between the two because the Party is also concerned with 
foreign economic and political issues which may contrast 
with the military dimension.
As has been mentioned above, the Party had several
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objectives which they wished to achieve through a policy of 
detente. These objectives were economic, military, and 
political. That was the problem; for detente to succeed in 
theory and by definition emphasis on the military was to be 
reduced and hostilities lessened. This would be opposed by 
the military. This opposition, in the beginning, was neutra­
lized by the Party because detente was very important to 
them. Detente was a foreign policy which also had implica­
tions for domestic policy. The transfer of grain shipments 
and western technology were of great importance to the Soviet 
economy. The importance of detente also explains the reason 
why Brezhnev in his early speeches emphasized the favour- 
ability of the international situation for peace and detente. 
He could hardly have argued for detente and then pointed out 
the hostility of the U.S. and its Western allies.
In summary, these conclusions about Party and military 
relations as they are affected by foreign policy can be 
reached s
1) The military, as shown in the speeches of Defense 
Ministers Grechko and Ustinov, believe that national mili­
tary security is of greater importance than a policy of 
detente.
2) The Party has placed greater emphasis on detente, 
as compared with national military security. Although mili­
tary security was still of greet importance.
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3) The military perceived the threat of the U.S. and 
its NATO allies to be high and had consistently said so*
4) The Party has not viewed the U.S. threat to be as 
great as the military has* On the other hand, during the 
early 1980*s it was beginning to set a hostile U.S. reaction*
Summary and Conclusion
In the economic aspects of the relationship the Party 
predominates because it is the formulator of the economic 
plans which will guide the growth of the Soviet economy.
Again, the military may advise and persuade but the ultimate 
authority rests with the Party. Much of the economic policy 
centered around a debate over heavy industry versus light 
industry. The Party in its actual spending allocations has 
shown a priority for heavy industry over light industry.
This places it in agreement with the military who have con* 
sidered heavy industry more important. In the long run, what 
has concerned the military the most has been military spending. 
These have grown at high rates and have been at levels of 50% 
of central government expenditures for the Soviet Union.
In so far that the military has been concerned about economic 
issues, it has been so over defense spending levels. The 
military and its leaders have shown much more activity in 
concern over foreign policy and relations with the U.S. and 
the Western nations.
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As is the case in the economic area, in the foreign 
policy realm the Party remains predominant. Much of the 
debate concerned the desire for detente and its objectives 
versus the need for national military security. As time went 
on and detente declined, the issue of national military 
security came to be more important. This is clearly reflected 
in the last speeches of Brezhnev and Ustinov. For the mili­
tary this meant a vindication of the position they had sup­
ported all along, while it placed the Party in a difficult 
position since it wished to continue detente but, according 
to the analysis of the international situation, this could not 
be done.
Increased military spending also had an effect on foreign 
policy. During the mid 1970s, the Soviet Union entered into 
a huge arms build up which allowed it to become a global power. 
Much of the Soviet Union’s global super-power status resulted 
from its military power. Thus, because military power has 
become important in foreign policy the military has now gained 
influence in this area.
The seven questions posed at the beginning of this paper 
may now be answered.
1) What is the relative importance of national military 
security as compared to continuing detente relations, and 
vice-versa, for the military and the Party? The answer is 
that the Party has ranked detente to be of greater importance 
than national military security. Over time this position has
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been modified to an extent that detente was not supported 
as strongly as it was before. The position of the military 
has been that at the very least detente should be pursued 
cautiously and at worst detente is a threat to national 
security. A great part of the difference of views on detente 
results from differing perception of the U.S. threat. This 
is a debate very similar to the one in the U.S.
2) What are the views of the Party and the military on 
the hostility or perceived threat of the U.S. and NATO. In 
general, the military leaders have shown the greatest mistrust 
towards the U.S., while the Party has been fairly optimistic 
and sanguine about the world situation. Some of the reasons
for this go hand in hand with reasons for detente. For instance, 
to support a policy of detente requires a belief that the world 
situation is fairly peaceful and that you are favored in it.
On the other hand, those who oppose detente do so because 
they believe the situation to be hostile and not necessarily 
in their favor. Thus, detente is seen as a threat to national 
security. The exact opposite will be argued by those who 
support detente. They will argue that detente by enhancing 
peaceful relations adds to national security.
3) What is the importance of increased defense spending 
as compared to other spending priorities? For the militaryr  
it is clear from the speeches that this is the number one 
spending priority. It is the duty of the Party to provide 
the necessary funding for defense projects. Coupled with
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the military's view of a hostile world, this usually means 
that more is not enough. Also for the Party, during the 
time period examined, military spending has been a priority 
item. It has taken up approximately half of all expendi* 
tures each year.
4) Does the military always ask for increased defense 
spending? The answer is yes. In every speech examined that 
was given by the military leaders there was a call for more 
money for defense. Defense against the U.S. threat requires 
many roubles and the Soviet leadership must be constantly 
reminded of this.
5) Where does heavy industry rank with light industry 
for both sides? As was noted in the discussion of economics, 
heavy industry has ranked comparatively higher than has light 
industry for both sides. The military has favored heavy 
industry because it is necessary for defense productions.
The Party has favored heavy industry because the traditional 
Soviet economic model favors heavy over light industry. It 
is also a much more spectacular area and easier to control.
6) Do the military and the Party agree or disagree on 
the issues raised by the above questions? Both have agreed 
on some issues, such as the importance of heavy industry 
and the need for high levels of military expenditures* Con* 
versely, they have disagreed on the desirability of detente 
and the significance of the U.S. threat, nevertheless, even 
though there has been heated disputes, this does not mean
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protracted conflict. When there has been a disagreement on 
issues the Party has won out. Their primacy in both the 
foreign policy and economic realms has been acknowledged by 
the military.
7) Do these views change or converge over time? Yes, they 
do but this occurred only in the foreign policy arena. Some of 
the views and attitudes of both have remained constant.
It is the Party's perception of the value of detente which 
has changed over time. In the beginning, the Party was quite 
excited about detente and was very optimistic about its 
potential for solving Soviet domestic and foreign problems.
The enthusiasm and support for detente waned as expectations 
for success were not met. The failure of SALT XI and the lack 
of success in trade were major disappointments. Thus, because 
the military had from the start not considered detente to be 
desirable, the positions of the two began to converge as the 
Party retreated from detente. This was reflected in the last 
speeches of Brezhnev and Ustinov.
In conclusion for the whole paper these remarks can be 
made. First the Party remains as the dominant actor in civil- 
military relations. Second, where the relations have been 
the most active and changing has been in the area of foreign 
policy. The military indicates in its speeches that economics 
as it relates to defense spending is an adjunct to foreign 
policy. Third, increased military expenditures especially in 
the conventional area have contributed to the influence of
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the military in foreign policy. Fourth, the high military 
expenditures have had the effect of "buying” the support 
of the military. Lastly, events in the U.S. can be and are 
reflected in the speeches made by the Soviet leaders* For 
instance, one of the speeches refers to Presidential Directive 
# 59 which changed the U.S. strategic warhead targeting*
Other speeches referred to President Reagan9s comments on 
limited nuclear war* Presidents, high governmental officials, 
and Presidential candidates should keep in mind that they have 
two audiencesi an American and a Soviet one* What they say, 
can and will be used against them*
In general, civil-military relations in the Soviet Union 
remain ai complicated affair. The lack of really hard data 
is the greatest obstacle to their analysis* Hopefully, this 
attempt of analysis of the data available inthe form of speeches 
will shed some light on the topic.
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